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Abstract 
In 2005, the number of organizations that described themselves as environmental NGOs 
reached 6,493. But, are all of these organizations part of same the environmental 
movement? This paper uses the tools of social network analysis to illustrate that the 
movement is actually an intertwined constellation of networks, each with multiple and 
differentiated constituencies, some of which intersect with business organizations.  By 
creating network clusters of NGOs based on (a) issue keywords, and (b) board interlocks 
with corporations and foundations, this paper challenges the simple classifications of 
“non-governmental organization” or “corporation” as accurate descriptors of who is in 
and who is out of the movement.  In the end, such classifications may serve as 
misnomers, lumping many organizations or clusters of organizations with varied interests 
into one category. This result has implications for both the roles that individual NGOs 
can play when engaging with business and how they interact with the network as a whole. 
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Who is in the environmental movement?  This is not such an easy question to 
answer in today’s political and market climate.  While we can simply identify the 
movement in terms of the non-governmental organization (NGOs) that set agendas on 
protecting the environment, that category of actors includes many organizations that may 
not share similar interests and excludes other organizations that fall outside such a 
singular definition.  Consider the following: 
 
• In 2000, law enforcement officials documented more than 30 acts of sabotage 
against genetic research. Activists trampled experimental grass fields in Oregon, 
pruned pinot noir vines and uprooted strawberry fields in California, and hacked 
down cornfields in Maine.  On New Year's Eve, arson destroyed a suite of offices 
in Michigan State University's Agriculture Hall. The environmental group, the 
Earth Liberation Front, claimed responsibility, saying it had focused on the 
building because of the program's ties to biotechnology.  Are groups identified by 
the FBI as terrorist organizations part of the environmental movement? 
• In 2006, Environmental Defense was invited to help broker a $45 billion 
leveraged buyout of Dallas-based TXU by two private equity firms -- Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co. and the Texas Pacific Group. Lawsuits to block 
construction of the plants were filed by a consortium of environmental NGOs as 
well as several ad hoc business organizations and a coalition of mayors and 
officials in 24 cities and counties organized by Dallas mayor Laura Miller. To get 
Environmental Defense and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to 
sign off on the deal, the equity firms promised to eliminate plans for eight of the 
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coal plants, reduce carbon output to 1990 levels by 2020, devote $400 million to 
energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, and support a federal cap-and-
trade system for greenhouse reductions. Is a group that brokers business deals in 
the same environmental movement as a group that commits arson? 
• In 2000, environmental activists, such as World Wildlife Fund and Amnesty 
International, joined fifty multinational corporations, such as DaimlerChrysler, 
Nike, Royal Dutch Shell, Bayer and Unilever, labor unions and the United 
Nations in signing the "global compact" on environmental protection and human 
rights. Are the corporations in this example part of the environmental 
movement?   
• In 2007, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, a consortium of ten blue-chip 
corporations and four non-governmental organizations, announced a call for 
federal standards on greenhouse emissions. Other corporations have derided these 
companies as “Kyoto capitalists” and the “carbon cartel,” while an editorial in the 
Wall Street Journal (2007) castigated these “10 jolly green giants” for pursuing a 
regulatory program “designed to financially reward companies that reduce CO2 
emissions and punish those that don’t.”  Are the goals of the corporations of the 
USCAP consistent with the goals of the environmental movement?   
 
In short, are all these examples part of the same “environmental” movement? And 
in them, who is part of the environmental movement and who is not?  This chapter will 
set the stage for the chapters that follow by deconstructing the environmental movement.  
How is it different from other social movements? Where are its boundaries? Who is in 
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and who is out?  While at first glance these may seem to be simple questions, this paper 
will use the tools of social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Borgatti 
Everett and Freeman 2002) to depict the environmental movement as an intertwined 
constellation of networks, each with multiple and differentiated constituencies.  It will 
challenge the simple classifications of “non-governmental organization” or “corporation” 
as accurate descriptors of who is in and who is out of the movement.  In the end, such 
classifications may serve as misnomers, lumping many organizations or clusters of 
organizations with varied interests into one category.  
 
BREAKING DOWN THE CONSTITUENCY  
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
When discussing the constituency of the environmental movement, one would 
natural begin with a discussion of the non-governmental organizations that identify 
themselves as such and constitute a social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
Strang and Soule 1998; Campbell 2005). This group of organizations is comprised of 
constituent groups that connect the values of their cause with their personal identity, 
creating a value congruence that is a potent force for social change. These activist 
organizations have little material stake in organizational output yet influence that output 
through ideological activism. They become, what may be described as cultural or 
institutional entrepreneurs (Troast, Hoffman, Riley and Bazerman 2002), driving change 
in the norms, values and beliefs of organizational systems.  
In 2005, the number of organizations that described themselves as environmental 
NGOs reached 6,493 (Gale Research 2005). But, are all of these organizations part of 
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same the environmental movement?  The fact is that the term “environmentalist” was not 
chosen by the organizations that find themselves branded by it.  It was a term coined by 
the press in 1970 to make sense of the 20 million activists that participated in the first 
Earth Day.  As this was an unprecedented event with obvious popular appeal and 
representative of a new movement, the media used the term in press accounts and it has 
remained as a definitive label.  But Evernden (1985: 125) warns that the very term itself 
may be a misnomer for such a large group of actors with negative implications. 
 
"The term 'environmentalist' was not chosen by the individuals so described.  
It was seized upon by members of the popular press as a means of labeling a 
newly prominent segment of society. . .In fact, the act of labeling a group may 
constitute an effective means of suppression, even if the label seems neutral or 
objective.  For in giving this particular name, not only have the labelers 
forced an artificial association on a very diverse group of individuals, but 
they have also given a terse public statement of what 'those people' are 
presumed to want.  Environmentalists want environment — obviously.  But 
this may be entirely wrong, a possibility that few environmentalists have 
contemplated even though many have lamented the term itself.  For in the very 
real sense there can only be environment in a society that holds certain 
assumptions, and there can only be an environmental crisis in a society that 
believes in environment." 
 
Environmental NGOs are, in fact, a diverse and heterogeneous group. While they 
share common attention towards issues regarding the natural environment, they differ in 
how that issue is operationalized or framed (e.g. ecosystem protection, diversity loss, 
climate change, energy efficiency, ozone depletion, and many others), with implications 
for the goals they strive for and the location of their supporters within the social structure 
(Zald and McCarthy 1987). Each of these frames draws in differing and interconnected 
constituencies.  
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For example, some NGOs seek completely non-confrontational means to achieve 
their goals of protecting ecosystems for conservation purposes (e.g. The Nature 
Conservancy). Some NGOs seek to protect these habitats for the purposes of sport (e.g. 
Trout Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited). Some are staffed with lawyers and scientists and 
work within existing institutions to bring about corporate and social change (e.g. the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense, World Wildlife Fund). 
Others prefer to remain outside those institutions, relying on less professionally oriented 
staff and working in a more confrontational style (e.g. Greenpeace USA, Rainforest 
Action Network). Still others prefer to engage in acts of sabotage and deliberate violation 
of the law, leading government agencies to label them terrorist groups (e.g. Earth First!, 
the Earth Liberation Front). 
Membership in the environmental movement is indeterminate (Beck 1992). 
Within the environmental movement there is not a demographic or well-structured 
political constituency, neither among proponents or opponents of particular 
environmental policy initiatives. Opposition to environmentalism on the grounds of 
threatened material interests or aversion to state intervention would be easier to explain 
than environmental advocacy (Buttel 1992). A high quality environment tends to be a 
public good, which when achieved cannot be denied to others, even to those who resist 
environmental reforms. For many environmental issues, those who act to protect the 
environment can expect to receive no personal material benefits (Buttel 1992). So the 
targets of their actions are left to decide who is a legitimate representative for 
environmental concerns. 
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The indeterminate nature of many environmental policy issues and solutions 
means that they attract a wide range of supporters cutting across social, economic and 
demographic lines. Environmental supporters may include employee groups, labor 
unions, community groups, consumers, environmental activists, investors, insurers, 
the government, industry competitors, internal managers and religious groups 
(Morrison 1991;Rockefeller and Elder 1992; Hoffman 2000; Brulle 2000; Warner and 
Sullivan 2004; Selsky and Parker 2005; Gottlieb 2006; Detomasi 2007). All of these 
constituents have to some degree become active environmental advocates (Hoffman 
2000).  
Of particular note has been the growing collaboration between NGOs and various 
corporations (Westley and Vredenburg 1991; de Bruijn and Tucker 2002; Rondinelli 
and London 2003; Pearce and Doh 2005; Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006) and 
foundations (Brulle and Jenkins 2005; Westhues and Einwiller 2006; Prewitt 2006). 
While such interaction is not new – philanthropic giving between businesses and NGOs 
began in the nineteenth century with the U.S. Congress allowing a federal income tax 
deduction for such activity in 1953 (Galskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006) – the form 
of this collaboration became more strategic, commercial and political in the 1990s 
(Galaskiewicz and Sinclair Colman 2006). At that time, more structured alliances 
between environmental NGOs and corporations (Westley and Vredenburg 1991; 
Rondinelli and London 2003; Orti 1995) and between foundations and environmental 
NGOs (Parker and Selsky 2004; Brulle and Jenkins 2005) began to take shape. These 
collaborations can take many forms, including philanthropic (giving money to NGOs), 
strategic (event sponsorships and donations of products/equipment), commercial (cause-
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related marketing, licensing of names and logos, and scientific collaborations) or political 
(policy-marketing and lobbying) (Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006). 
Beyond this breadth of engaged constituencies, the movement engaged by 
environmental issues is distinct for its inclusion of two unique actors. The first is a 
decidedly non-social constituent. More than just a constituency of social advocates, there 
is also the environment itself to contend with. The prominence and power of 
environmental changes act as a form of social pressure, placing demands on social, 
political, economic and technical institutions which are unique from other demands that 
societies face. Events like climate change, species extinction, acid rain, the ozone hole, 
fisheries collapse, and others focus attention without clarity and sometimes without 
warning, imposing demands for action and change. While open to social interpretation 
and enactment (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001), environmental events nonetheless force 
organizational and institutional interests to devote resources and attention to the issue. In 
essence, the environment itself becomes a social movement constituent. 
The second unique movement participant is a social constituent who is not yet 
social. Environmental issues (such as ozone depletion, species extinction, and climate 
change) typically raise basic issues of inter-generational goods, boundaries, and resource 
claims (Wade-Benzoni 1996). The vast geographic scales and long time horizons 
involved to preserve the long-term viability of the ecosystem on the behalf of future 
generations are difficult to represent adequately in policy discussions. Since future 
generations cannot express their interests in contemporary social debates, their needs are 
open to social interpretation and enactment by cultural and institutional entrepreneurs 
much like the interpretation of environmental events. The inclusion of these two 
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unconventional actors expands the range of socials movement participation and creates 
greater challenges for both organizational actors and researchers.  In the end, the 
ambiguity of what is called an environmental activist necessitates a more critical analysis 
of the boundaries and makeup of this group of organizations (Zald 2007).   
 
THE NETWORK OF NGOS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
Recent analysis (Hoffman 2009) uses empirical measurement of social network 
ties (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002) among NGOs to 
examine the form of networks within the movement.  Drawing boundaries between and 
linkages among various actors in the movement in terms of network dynamics is 
important for explaining how the behavior of one set of actors influences the beliefs and 
actions of another set (Powell, White, Koput and Owen-Smith 2005). A sample pool of 
the largest 72 environmental groups by budget was gathered from the Encyclopedia of 
Associations (Gale Research 2005).  These groups range in size from 100 members to 1.2 
million (average 136,000), in budget from $1 million to $245 billion (average $18.5 
million) and in date of formation from 1875 to 1995 (average 1958). Overall, while the 
sample is biased towards large national and international groups, it is a useful sample for 
developing a picture of one piece of the NGO movement related to the environment and 
how that sample is clustered into smaller populations.  
Mapping of this sample was conducted using subject keywords.  Within the 
Encyclopedia, the Gale editorial staff works in conjunction with a content development 
vendor to create new or updated content on a continuous basis throughout the year. The 
categories and keywords are assigned by the vendor based on a list created by Gale 
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Research and reviewed by the editorial staff when the organization's entry is keyed as a 
new entry. Information is obtained and updated through direct contact with the 
organization, typically via email or their website.  Once the categories and keywords are 
assigned, they generally don't change. In the rare instance that an organization requests 
that a particular keyword be assigned to their entry, the editorial staff will oblige as long 
as the keyword makes sense.  
Within the sample set of this study, 28 total keywords were identified by members 
(with a range of 1 to 5 keywords per NGO). Keywords included: “agriculture,” “bird,” 
“conservation,” “deer,” “education,” “energy,” “environmental protection,” “fish,” 
“forestry,” “health,” “international development,” “law,” “marine biology,” “natural 
resources,” “nuclear weapons,” “paper,” “parks and recreation,” “politics,” “pollution 
control,” “primates,” “rain forests,” “rangeland,” “tropical studies,” “water,” “wetlands,” 
“wildlife,” “wood,” and “world affairs.”  
Using these keywords as network ties among NGOs, the first network map was 
created to identify clusters of organizations shown in figure 3-1a.  The nodes in the figure 
represent the 72 NGOs in the sample set.  The ties represent common keywords among 
them.  
 
Insert Figure 3-1a here 
 
Within this network map, three dominant populations capture 96 percent of the 
sample.  Each term reflects a different field frame (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994) of the 
population’s goal and purpose. The term “pollution control” refers to the direct control of 
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emissions and effluents into air, water or soil from consumption, heating, agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, transportation and other human activities that, left unchecked, 
will degrade the environment.  “Environmental protection” is a broader term, addressing 
actions at international, national and local levels to prevent and, where possible, reverse 
environmental degradation of ecosystems. This term often has a legislative component to 
it. “Conservation” refers to groups that seek the preservation and protection of the 
environment and the natural things within it, some for its own sake, others for the benefit 
of human beings. These clusters represent three overlapping but distinct movements 
within what we call the environmental movement. There are many more. 
Looking further at the dataset reveals that smaller sectors emerge around specific 
issues, as shown in figure 3-1b, and specific species, as shown in figure 3-1c. 
 
Insert Figures 3-1b and 3-1c here 
 
What becomes evident from these network maps is that the constellation of the 
largest NGOs in the environmental movement is, in fact, an interconnected series of 
smaller networks based on issues of relevance to the individual members.  So, while they 
may be identified as part of the same movement, they are diverse and heterogeneous in 
their makeup. 
 
LINKAGES AMONG NGOS, CORPORATIONS  
AND FOUNDATIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
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Further analysis of board interlocks (Hoffman and Bertels 2007) looks more 
deeply at the patterns of interconnections between these NGOs and corporations and 
foundations. Boards are charged with the “ultimate responsibility for the non-profit 
organizations that they oversee” and serve as an important channel for “connecting 
individual institutions to their larger context” (Ostrower and Stone 2006: 612). Board 
interlocks are mechanisms for gaining access to critical resources such as information 
and, of particular importance to NGOs, funding “both because individual board members 
will influence their corporations’ giving and because the closer connections they have to 
others will also raise overall giving levels” (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007). But board 
interlocks also become mechanisms for influence by incorporating “representatives of 
external groups into the decision-making or advisory structure of an organization” (Scott 
and Davis 2007: 235).  As such they represent a significant measure of interconnection 
between NGOs and other constituencies.   
Using the list of the largest 54 environmental organizations from the 
Encyclopedia of Associations (Gale Research 2005), the lists of the boards of directors 
was collecting using IRS 990 forms for the years 2000 and 2005.  Then this list was 
cross-referenced with the membership of public U.S. companies found in Compact 
Disclosure®, a database that provides access to SEC-filed financial and other information 
contained within Annual Reports, Proxy Statements, and 10-K/20-F filings for over 
12,000 companies.  Lastly, a list was generated of foundations that had donated more 
than $100,000 in any given year between 1999 and 2004 to any of the 54 NGOs on the 
list through GuideStar®, a database that compiles financial information from the IRS 
Business Master File of exempt organizations and IRS Forms 990, 990-EZ, and 990-PF 
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(Philanthropic Research, Inc. 2007). The list of board members for each of these 
foundations was generated from their websites, annual reports and IRS 990 forms and 
cross referenced with the database of NGO board members.   
Using the aggregate network data from the sample set creates a depiction of an 
interconnected constellation of actors: 54 NGOs, 425 corporations, and 156 foundations 
sharing communication ties through 422 common board members for the combined years 
2000 and 2005 (361 common board members in 2000 and 383 common board members 
in 2005). A comparison of the 2000 and 2005 data shows that the overall number of 
board level ties increased by 3% while the average distance between reachable pairs 
decreased, suggesting that the individual actors in the field are becoming more closely 
tied. But this increase in connections is not uniform or homogenous. Centralization 
within the field increased by 54% suggesting that there are certain areas within the field 
where clustering among organizations is growing more acute.  
Looking more specifically at the types of the changing tie patterns in the sample 
set, we see that NGOs are becoming more interconnected with other members of the field 
-- an 18% increase. This increase manifests itself primarily in a 44% increase in ties 
between NGOs and a 25% increase in ties between NGOs and foundations. Similarly, the 
density of ties between NGOs increased by 44% and the corresponding measure between 
NGOs and foundations increased by 23%. A modest 4% increase in ties between NGOs 
and corporations was also detected (N to C tie density increased by 5%).  
With this conceptualization, we can think of the movement forming at the 
intersection of common channels of dialogue and discussion among three populations: 
NGOs, corporations and foundations, as shown in figure 3-2. In domain “A” we find a 
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population of NGOs that were isolates and having ties only with other NGOs. In domains 
B, C, and D, we find varying types of engagement among NGOs, foundations and 
corporations.  
 
Insert Figure 3-2 about here 
 
This is a critically important finding as it demonstrates a distinction beyond 
keywords among NGOs in the environmental movement.  It suggests a differentiation in 
terms of who NGOs consider to be valid partners for engagement and the tactics used to 
engage them. Some groups define their identity in opposition to corporations and 
corporate activities.  For them, alliances with corporations are anathema.  This makes it 
easy to mobilize action against a clear target. Other groups define their identity in 
conjunction with business and the capitalist system.  For them, alliances with 
corporations are a useful means to further their agenda.  
Looking more closely at the specific actor types within the domains in figure 3-2, 
we can see that organizations in domains B, C and D (e.g. Environmental Defense and 
World Wildlife Fund, shown in figure 3-3) have strong networks of ties while those in 
domain A (e.g. Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network, shown in figure 3-3) have no 
such ties.   
 
Insert Figure 3-3 about here 
 
THE RADICAL FLANK EFFECT: 
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CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT; “DARK GREENS” OR “BRIGHT GREENS” 
This distinction between those with business ties and those without is 
representative of a schism that seems to be emerging between two camps in the 
environmental movement. Some groups define their identity in a conflict orientation to 
corporations and corporate activities. Other groups define their identity in terms of a 
consensus orientation with business and the capitalist system (Schwartz and Shuva 1992). 
And still others lie somewhere between these poles.   
But all postures lie within the same interconnected environmental movement and 
this creates an awkward tension as the actions of one group are tied to and influenced by 
the actions of the other. Both how they are positioned and how they are viewed is central 
to their ability effect change. Movement positioning falls along a continuum (as depicted 
in figure 3-4a) where NGOs and corporations can position themselves on the spectrum 
with the left representing more of a conflict orientation and the right representing more of 
a consensus orientation. More recent popular terminology within the environmental 
movement has also emerged to highlight these differences within the environmental 
movement – “dark greens” move further to the left of the continuum and seek radical 
political change in the dominant market system, while “bright greens” focus on engaging 
within the market system to develop better designs and technologies that will ameliorate 
contemporary environmental problems. Conner and Epstein (2007) describe the core of 
this schism as the tension between purity and pragmatism and suggest that the gulf 
between them is widening. 
 
Insert Figure 3-4a here 
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[Editor layout note: Figures 3-4a and 3-4b should be even 
with each other on opposite facing pages, 3-4a on the left, 
3-4b on the right] 
 
One reason for the widening gulf is funding. NGOs with ties to corporations and 
foundations have more money.  Using least squares regression, there is a strong 
correlation between the number of corporate and foundation ties and the size of an 
NGO’s budget in both 2000 (p<0.001) and 2005 (p<0.01). This effect was much stronger 
for corporate ties than for foundation ties. And some within the environmental movement 
feel that this funding co-opts those who receive it. A recent book by Christine 
MacDonald (2008), the former media manager at Conservation International, expresses 
outrage at environmental NGOs for accepting donations from oil, lumber and mining 
industries without holding them accountable for ongoing pollution practices. She charges 
that the association between environmental NGOs and corporations has lead to a system 
of co-optation, where the outcome is assisted greenwashing. 
But these different strategies are critical for the overall impact of the movement. 
Both camps are needed for the environmental movement to achieve its objectives 
(Conner and Epstein 2007). The ability of more moderate, consensus-oriented NGOs to 
operate as change agents is influenced by the presence of more radical, conflict-oriented 
ENGOs through what is called the “radical flank effect” (Haines 1984), a mechanism 
triggered by the bifurcation of a social movement into radical and moderate factions 
(Gupta 2002). The effect of this polarization within the same movement can have both 
negative and positive outcomes (Gupta 2002). 
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Negative radical flank effect. In this view, the effects of more radical 
organizations in the movement can have a negative effect on moderate groups by creating 
a comparison effect and a backlash among opposing groups. In this negative radical flank 
effect (Haines 1984), all members of the environmental movement are viewed in the 
same way as the more visible radical members.  “Even if moderates and radicals embrace 
considerably different goals and tactics, their coexistence and common identification as 
members of the same movement field reflects badly on the moderates and harms their 
ability to achieve their objectives” (Gupta 2002: 6). So, for example, when an 
environmental extremist group creates headlines for a terrorist act, all environmental 
groups may be viewed in the same light, thus limiting their ability to operate as legitimate 
members of social debates.  Evidence of this effect can be seen in some public opinion 
polls. For example, the percentage of people who agree with the statement “most people 
actively involved in environmental groups are extremists, not reasonable people” 
increased from 32 percent in 1996 to 41 percent in 2000 (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 
2004).  
Positive radical flank effect. In this view, the effects of more radical 
organizations in the movement can have a positive effect on moderate groups by creating 
a contrast effect (Haines 1984).  All members of the environmental movement are viewed 
in contrast to other members and extreme positions from some members can make other 
organizations seem more reasonable to movement opponents (McAdam 1992). For 
example, many have argued that that Martin Luther King was seen as more moderate by 
the American public in the 1960s because he was viewed in contrast to the more radical 
Malcolm X militancy.  Similarly, radicals in the civil rights movement in the 1960s 
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increased the level of funding for moderate groups (Haines 1984). Bringing this effect to 
the environmental movement, we can see radical groups pushing organizations towards 
engaging with moderate groups.  For example, when the Rainforest Action Network 
threatens to protest at Staple’s for the company’s limited offerings of recycled paper, the 
company solicited the assistance of what were perceived as more moderate groups, like 
Environmental Defense. While still part of the same movement, Environmental Defense 
was seen as more moderate and therefore more palatable and legitimate for a partnership. 
In the 1970s, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA once quipped, “Thank God 
for the David Brower’s of the world. They make the rest of us seem reasonable” (US 
Environmental Protection Agency 1993).  
The strategy of flank effects. Positioning on the continuum in figure 3-4a 
becomes critical for understanding the dynamics of social change and the players that 
promote it. This consideration is important for funding, membership, partnerships (with 
companies and other NGOs), media attention, and ability to mobilize people – in short 
power to play the role of institutional entrepreneur. Further, it is important to understand 
where your constituency lies and the positioning they are willing to support. Earth First! 
or the Earth Liberation Front, for example, find that culturally (and legally) illegitimate 
activities on the far left of the continuum can further their goals and bolster their support 
within the narrow segment of society that endorse such controversial action (Elsbach and 
Sutton 1992). Other groups, such as The Nature Conservancy or Environmental Defense 
Fund, prefer to work more towards the right, within the institutions of society and utilize 
legitimate market based activities to achieve their ends. When the position matches their 
constituency’s expectations, resources flow. But if an NGO drifts too far from their core 
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position on the continuum, they may find membership and donations impacted. For 
example, in the mid-1990s, Greenpeace found that their reputation suffered for their 
efforts to work with corporations in a less confrontational style. They were moving more 
to the right on the continuum. To correct this repositioning, the group staged an “eco-
commando” action on the Brent Spar oil rig in 1995, being sure to have the media alerted 
and on hand. This action reestablished their more confrontational image and moved them 
back to the left of the continuum.  
Application of this continuum is not restricted to NGOs.  It also applies to 
corporations. Shown in figure 3-4b, corporations can range from conflict to consensus 
orientation with respect to NGOs. This has been illustrated most vividly in the debate 
within corporate circles around the issue of climate change.  In 1997, BP was the first to 
shift its position on the issue and acknowledge that climate change was a problem that 
needed to be addressed.  It is doubtful that this moderate consensus-oriented position 
could have been as effective if Exxon-Mobil had not staked out the more radical, 
conflict-oriented position of disputing the science.  Even more recently, as some 
companies have begun taking proactive actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
calling for federal regulation, other companies have openly resented these actions and 
derided them with such terms as “Kyoto capitalists” or the “carbon cartel.” For example, 
when General Electric announced plans to publish its first “Citizenship Report,” the Wall 
Street Journal was again critical that environmentalists had made their “biggest catch 
yet” and pondered whether “capitalists are abandoning capitalism” (Murray 2005: A2). 
To mirror the popular terminology among environmental NGOs, might we refer to the 
more radical corporate organizations as “dark blue” and the more moderate organizations 
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as “bright blue”? Such terminology can be helpful in understanding the positioning of 
players on these issues and the interaction effects among them. 
 
Insert Figure 3-4b here 
[Editor layout note: Figures 3-4a and 3-4b should be even 
with each other on opposite facing pages, 3-4a on the left, 
3-4b on the right] 
 
The radical flank effect is in place in both the corporate and NGO continuums.  
And we can hypothesize that, while both the negative and positive effects can be seen in 
various populations, we would expect the negative flank effect to most prevalent at the 
extreme conflict-oriented positions, as negative projections on the entire community they 
oppose supports their orientation.  The positive flank effect should be most prevalent 
towards the consensus-oriented positions on the continuum as these organizations – 
whether corporate or NGO -- will likely have a more nuanced understanding of the 
breadth of the continuum given their experiences through engagement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
When asking the question – who is in the environmental movement? – it is best to 
think of the movement as a series of intertwined networks comprised of a diverse array of 
actors. As such, they “can be characterized exclusively as a web-like structure of 
informal, unorganized relations of cooperation and communication among local cells” 
(Zald and McCarthy 1987: 162). These cells include not only NGOs, but also 
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corporations, foundations and other organizational actors.  Their presence within the 
movement is a signal of both convergence of ideas between change agents and change 
targets, but also as a signal of cooptation and conformity. Through steady interaction 
NGOs can find themselves aligning more with the corporations they are trying to 
influence than the cause to which they were originally attached (Michels 1962). By 
understanding the network configuration of the web-like structure that is the 
environmental movement, we can better assess the form their agenda takes, the resources 
that are brought to bear and the channels of influence that are utilized.  
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Figure 3-4b 
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